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Contact Tracing during COVID-19

Emily S. Gurley, PhD, MPH MAAETC Webinar 17 September 2020



Speaker Disclosure

Speakers are required to disclose any commercial relationships before today's presentation.




HIV and SARS-CoV-2 parallels

- Pandemics resulting from zoonotic transmission from wildlife
- Take advantage of our social connections to propagate
- Successful control requires global coordination <u>and</u> intensely local focus
- Social networks and 'connectedness' drive patterns over space and time
- Lay bare the disparities in access to healthcare, public health interventions, and ability to mitigate risk for infection



Risk of COVID-19 in July 2020


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NPR: <u>https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/07/01/885263658/green-yellow-orange-or-red-this-new-tool-shows-covid-19-risk-</u>

Rates of HIV in US, 2018

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US CDC: <u>https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/overview/geographicdistribution.html</u>

Objectives for the talk

- 1. Describe the process of contact tracing for COVID-19 and how it prevents transmission
- 2. Describe how contact tracing for COVID-19 fits within a comprehensive strategy to control COVID-19 transmission and how we measure impact
- 3. Discuss major barriers to effective contact tracing and strategies to overcome them



How contact tracing works



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Public Health Prevention for COVID-19

If we can limit contact between people who are infected and others, we can limit opportunities for the virus to be transmitted



Timeline of Infection: Infectious Period

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


Image source: Center for Teaching and Learning, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.

Timeline of Infection: Infected Contact







Image source: Center for Teaching and Learning, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. AETC AIDS E Trainin MidAtlantic

Timeline of Infection: Window of Opportunity

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Cases and Contacts

Case

- Someone who has COVID-19
- Usually has a positive laboratory test
- Suspect or probable case
 - Someone exposed to a case who develops symptoms, even if they have not had a test yet

Contact

- Someone who had contact with a case while they were infectious
 - During their illness
 - 2 days before their illness began
- Three kinds of contact
 - Physical contact
 - Close contact: within 6 feet for 15+ minutes (10 or 30)
 - Proximate contact: more than 6 feet but in the same room for an extended period



Isolation vs. Quarantine

Isolation

- Keeps sick people separate from healthy people
- Restricted to home or hotel
- Separate space in hospital to limit contact
- For duration of infectiousness
 - 2 days before onset
 - At least 10 days after onset of illness; symptoms must be improving *and* no fever within the past 24 hours

Quarantine

- Restricts movement and contact of healthy people who have been exposed
- For 14 days since the last contact with the person who is infected



Six Steps to Investigate Cases and Trace Their Contacts



yourself to the case and get their basic information Figure out the case's likely infectious period Ask the case about contacts during their infectious period Provide isolation instructions to the case, identify challenges, and provide support Call case's contacts to inform about their exposure, ask about symptoms, and give quarantine instructions


the case and their contacts until their isolation or quarantine ends



Image source: Center for Teaching and Learning, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.

Balance Between the Public Health Good and Individual Rights

- Contact tracing programs are a public good because they reduce the risk to the public from COVID-19
- We must balance this good for society with rights of privacy, confidentiality, and autonomy





The Three Legal "Tests" for a Public Health Intervention

- For a public health intervention to be able to limit the rights of individuals to privacy or autonomy, it must meet three "tests" or criteria:
 - 1. The intervention must be respectful of individuals and their rights
 - 2. It must be a benefit to society that is balanced with the limits on individuals
 - 3. It must benefit all members of society



Measuring impact of contact tracing




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Impact of contact tracing depends on completeness and timing

Does contact tracing work?



Is it worth doing?

Is contact tracing enough to keep transmission under control?

- Not an all or nothing strategy
- Effectiveness of the program determined by how complete and how quick it is



The *proportion of infections* that your surveillance system detects affects the impact of your contact tracing program

These Are All the Infected People in Your Population ...





Image source: Center for Teaching and Learning, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.



Some May Never Develop Symptoms and So Will Be Harder to Find



80% Symptomatic

20% Asymptomatic



Proportion of All Infected People Detected by Surveillance—1





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AETC AIDS Education & Training Center Program

Proportion of All Infected People Detected by Surveillance—2




The *timing* of contact notification and quarantine affects the impact of your contact tracing program

SARS-CoV-2: Infectiousness Over Time

Onset of infectiousness is, on average, 3 days after infection


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SARS-CoV-2: Infectiousness Over Time—Duration

- Duration of infectiousness is about 8 to 9 days after illness onset (but can be longer for those who are severely ill)
- Asymptomatic people likely have a similar duration of infectiousness (but are less infectious than people who develop symptoms)


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
SARS-CoV-2: Infectiousness Over Time—Peak

 Infectiousness *peaks* around time of onset of symptoms

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


Infectious Period and Transmission



- Curve represents the infectious period of a case identified in surveillance
- This case is called Generation 0
- Subsequent generations will be Generation 1, 2, and so on


Infectious Period and Transmission—Generation 0 to 1



- Curve represents the infectious period of a case identified in surveillance
- This case is called Generation 0
- Subsequent generations will be Generation 1, 2, and so on
- We want a measure of how quickly each successive generation occurs


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Serial Interval as an Approximation of Generation Time



- *Generation time* is the time from the infection in one generation to the time of infection in the next generation (5 days)
- This is a measure of how quickly the outbreak will grow


Serial Interval as an Approximation of Generation Time



- Generation time is the time from the infection in one generation to the time of infection in the next generation (5 days)
- This is a measure of how quickly the outbreak will grow
- Serial interval is the time between onset of symptoms in one generation to the next

31


Timing of Contact Tracing Matters Because of Generation Time




- Think about if, how, and when contact tracing happens
- What will be the effect on transmission?

32


Timing of Contact Notification and Quarantine Linked to Case Detection



Timing of Contact Notification and Quarantine Linked to Case Detection




Separate Household and Community Contacts




- Closest contacts at higher risk than others
- Closest contacts easier to find than others

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
High-Risk Contacts Can Be Identified More Quickly



Delayed Quarantine of Community Contacts Still Has Impact




Decreased Delay at Each Step = Big Impact on Transmission



Basic Reproductive Number (R0 or R-Naught)

- Basic reproductive number—the number of people one infectious person will infect if everyone that person has contact with is susceptible
- The higher the basic reproductive number, the more people will be infected
- R0 of 1 means new cases stay constant






Basic Reproductive Number (R0) vs. Reproductive Number (R)

Basic reproductive number (R0)	Reproductive number (R)
R0 is the average number infected if all contacts are susceptible	 R is an indicator of transmission <i>after</i> interventions
It is determined by the pathogen and the context	 If not everyone is susceptible, it will bring down R Interventions like contact tracing or social
	distancing will bring down R

The difference between R0 and R is a good way to measure impact of contact tracing programs

Change From R0 to R as a Measure of Impact—1


- Interventions can reduce reproductive number
- Let's assume that each person infects 2 more, on average






Change From R0 to R as a Measure of Impact—2

- Interventions can reduce reproductive number
- Let's assume that each person infects 2 more, on average
- Intervention can reduce 1 new infection at each step
- This changes the overall size of outbreak





Impact of Contact Tracing Measured as Change From R0 to R





Indicators Needed to Estimate Impact on R0

- What proportion of all infectious people does surveillance identify?
- What proportion of infected people are isolated?
- What proportion of contacts are quarantined?

Timing

- Average duration rather than proportion
 - What is the average time between symptom onset and isolation?
 - What is the average time between exposure and quarantine among contacts?
 - Does this duration differ for household contacts?









CONTESSA

Welcome to the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Contact Tracing Evaluation and Strategic Support Application (ConTESSA). This application was designed for contact tracing program managers looking to:

1. Quantify the current impacts of their contact tracing programs

2. Identify what kinds of program changes would yield the greatest reductions in COVID-19 transmission

3. Share their results with colleagues

https://iddynamicsjhu.shinyapps.io/contessa/

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ConTESSA Overview

What this application *can provide*:

- Decision support tool
- Custom estimates of possible impact of given contact tracing strategy
- Direct comparison of two strategies

- ► What this application *does not provide*:
 - Exact calculation
 - Forecast of future disease burden

The metrics customize a dynamic infection model



Barriers to success

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Not isolating enough people with infections quickly

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Cause	Possible remedies
 Surveillance insufficient Not enough people with symptoms tested Lack of access Fear 	 Improve access Analyses to identify gaps
 Stigma People exposed not systematically tested Lack of access and bandwidth in testing systems Misguided policy 	Community outreach
 Time from onset of infectiousness to isolation too slow Delays in seeking a test 	 Hold test providers accountable for reasonable timelines
 Delays in returning test results Delays in isolation 	 Make use of rapid antigen tests
and the second	48

Insufficient support for isolation and quarantine

Cause	Possible remedies
Risk of job loss	Changes to workplace policy for sick leave
Risk of income loss	 Government support to promote isolation and quarantine
 Inability to isolate safely at home No way to isolate 	Safe housing for isolation and quarantine
Home not safe	

Lack of trust

Cause	
 Chronic public health issue Part of the lack of access cycle 	
Public health responses politicized	
 Misinformation about government tracking citizens 	

Possible remedy

- Community outreach and shared decisionmaking
- Improved communication and efforts to get people the right information
- Building as many bridges as possible with all communities



Summary

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Contact tracing is an important tool to control COVID-19

- Completeness and timing are important
- Facilitated by programs, but relies on public trust and ability to act
- Question isn't *if* programs work, but *how well* they work
 Not an all or nothing endeavor
- Very important to reach marginalized communities
 - Public good
 - Most at-need



Resources

- Free courses on Coursera
 - COVID-19 Contact Tracing
 - Measuring and Maximizing Impact of COVID-19 Contact Tracing

- Contact Tracing Evaluation and Strategic Support Application (ConTESSA) <u>https://iddynamicsjhu.shinyapps.io/contessa/</u>
- Maximizing and evaluating the impact of test-trace-isolate programs. <u>https://medrxiv.org/cgi/content/short/2020.09.02.20186916v1</u>



MidAtlantic AIDS Education and Training Center - Contact Information

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